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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)®.
STATEMENT OF T H E ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
and T H E STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1; Does the failure of the oral shareholder agreements to comply with the
writing and signing requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 (1992) make them
unenforceable?
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On July 5, 2005, Mr. Stowell filed a Notice of Appeal
(R327-28), appealing the trial court's Ruling and Order of June 8, 2005 (EL 317-26).
Issue No. 2: Did the oral shareholder agreements expire and become unenforceable
due to their failure to comply with the 10-year term requirement of Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-732(2)(c)?
Issue preserved for Appeal: On July 5, 2005, Mr. Stowell filed a Notice of Appeal
(R327-28), appealing the trial court's Ruling and Order of June 8, 2005 (R. 317-26).
Issue No. 3: Do the oral shareholder agreements constitute personal services
contracts that expired upon Gary Osder's death in 2003?
Issue preserved for Appeal: On July 5, 2005, Mr. Stowell filed a Notice of Appeal
(R327-28), appealing the trial court's Ruling and Order of June 8, 2005 (EL 317-26).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, [this Court] give[s]
the trial courtfs ruling no deference and reviewfs] it under a correctness standard." St.
Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,196 (Utah 1991). Further, "[w]hen

reviewing a trial court's grant of a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, '[this Court] acceptfs] the
factual allegations in the complaint as true and considers] them and all reasonable inferences
to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff/" Alvare^ v. Galetka,
933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1991) (quoting St. Benedicts Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 196).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 (1992) provides:
(1) An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation
that complies with this section is effective among the
shareholders and the corporation even though it is
inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this
chapter in that it:
(a) eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion
or powers of the board of directors;
(b) governs the authorization or making of distributions
whether or not in proportion to ownership of shares, subject to
the limitations in Section 16- 10a-640;
(c) establishes who shall be directors or officers of the
corporation, or their terms of office or manner of selection or
removal;

(e) establishes the terms and conditions of any agreement
for the transfer or use of property or the provision of services
between the corporation and any shareholder, director,
officer or employee of the corporation or among any of them;
(f) transfers to one or more shareholders or other persons all
or part of the authority to exercise the corporate powers or
to manage the business and affairs of the corporation,
including the resolution of any issue about which there exists a
deadlock among directors or shareholders;.... or
(h) otherwise governs the exercise of the corporate powers
or the management of the business and affairs of the
corporation or the relationship among the shareholders, the

directors and the corporation, or among any of them, and is not
contrary to public policy.
(2) An agreement authorized by this section shall be:
(a) set forth:
(i) in the articles of incorporation or bylaws and approved by all
persons who are shareholders at the time of the agreement; or
(ii) in a written agreement that is signed by all persons who
are shareholders at the time of the agreement and is made
known to the corporation;
(b) subject to amendment only by all persons who are
shareholders at the time of the amendment, unless the
agreement provides otherwise; and
(c) valid for 10 years, unless the agreement provides
otherwise.
(3) The existence of an agreement authorized by this
section shall be noted conspicuously on the front or back
of each certificate for outstanding shares or on the
information statement required by Section 16-10a-626(2). If at
the time of the agreement the corporation has shares
outstanding represented by certificates, the corporation shall
recall the outstanding certificates and issue substitute certificates
that comply with this subsection. . . .

(5) An agreement authorized by this section that limits the
discretion or powers of the board of directors shall relieve the
directors of, and impose upon the person or persons in whom
the discretion or powers are vested, liability for acts or
omissions imposed by laws on directors to the extent that the
discretion or powers of the directors are limited by the
agreement.
(6) The existence or performance of an agreement authorized by
this section may not be a ground for imposing personal liability
on any shareholder for the acts or debts of the corporation even
if the agreement or its performance treats the corporation as if it
were a partnership or results in failure to observe the corporate

formalities otherwise applicable to the matters governed by the
agreement.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-801 (1992) provides:
(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-732, each corporation
must have a board of directors.
(2) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of, and the business and affairs of the
corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of
incorporation or in an agreement authorized under Section
16-10a-732.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1701 (1992) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in Section 16-10a-1704, this
chapter applies to all domestic corporations in existence
on July 1,1992, that were incorporated under any general
statute of this state providing for incorporation of
corporations for profit, and to actions taken by the directors,
officers, and shareholders of such corporations after July 1.
1992.
(Emphasis added.)
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal from the trial court's Ruling and Order dated June 8, 2005, granting
the Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss of Dale Ostier, Vyron Ostler, Ostier International, Inc.
and Ostler Property Development, Inc. (the "Motions")(R. 317-32). The trial court found
that Mr. StowelPs Complaint failed to state legally viable claims for relief against Ostier
International, Inc., Ostler Property Development, Inc., Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostier for
three reasons:

First, the trial court held that the oral shareholder agreements (Complaint ^ 21 [R. 5]
& Tf 27 [R. 8]) (collectively referred to as the "Oral Agreements") upon which Mr. Stowell's
claims were premised did not comply with the mandatory writing requirement set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(2) (1992). Specifically, the trial court found that "an
agreement formed which allows a corporation to operate outside of the requirements of the
[Utah Revised Business Corporation Act], 'shall be set forth' in the articles of incorporation
or bylaws, or in a written agreement." (Ruling and Order p. 6; R. 322). The Complaint
alleges and, therefore, there was no dispute, that the Oral Agreements were oral and not in
writing.
Second, the trial court held that even if Section 732(2)'s writing and signing
requirements were somehow inapplicable to the Oral Agreements upon which Mr. Stowell's
claims were based, those agreements expired 10 years after their formation: "[Ujnless the
agreement provides specifically for the agreement to endure beyond ten years, it falls within
the default operation of subsection 2(c), which is that it 'shall be . . . valid for 10 years.'"
(Ruling and Order p. 6; R. 322). The Complaint alleges that the two Oral Agreements are 12
and 17 years old. Accordingly, the trial court held, "[bjecause the corporations were formed
in 1988 and 1993, any agreement ceased to be enforceable no later than July 2003, which,
coincidentally was about the time of Gary's death." (Ruling and Order pp. 6-7; R. 322-23).
Third, the trial court held that the Oral Agreements between Dale Ostler and Gary
Ostler were personal to Dale Oslter and Gary Ostler and "cannot be enforced beyond the
grave." (Ruling and Order p. 8; R. 324).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Accepting the facts pled in the Complaint as true, for the purposes of this appeal
only, the following is a fair summary of the material facts in this case:
Gary W. Osder and Dale Osder were brothers. (Complaint If 2; R. 2). In January
1988, Gary and Dale Osder incorporated Osder International, Inc. (Complaint % 8; R. 2). In
July of 1993, Gary and Dale Osder incorporated Osder Property Development, Inc.
(Complaint % 9; R. 3). Both Osder International, Inc., and Osder Property Development,
Inc. (collectively, the "Osder Corporations") are Utah corporations. (Complaintfflf3-4; R. 2).
No bylaws have been adopted for either corporation. (Complaint fflf 19-20; R. 4). Gary and
Dale Osder were the only shareholders in the Osder Corporations, each brother holding
50% of the shares in each corporation. (Complaint ^j 10; R. 3).
Gary Osder died in an airplane accident on July 13, 2003. (Complaint f 1; R. 2). Dale
Osder holds 50% of the shares and the Estate of Gary Osder holds 50% of the shares of the
Osder Corporations. (Complaint ^f 11; R. 3). Appellant Douglas L. Stowell is the personal
representative of the Estate of Gary Osder. (Complaint ^f 1; R. 2).
Gary and Dale Osder verbally agreed as the shareholders in the Ostler Corporations
that "all policy of the [Osder Corporations] would be adopted and implemented and the
company managed, operated and its business conducted only upon and pursuant to the
mutual consent and agreement of the company's shareholders."(Complaint ^f 27; R. 8).
Furthermore, pursuant to the Oral Agreements:
All policy and practices for the operation of Ostler
International and for the operation of Ostler Property
Development, including the conduct of the business of
each company and the making of net income distributions
to shareholders of each company was formulated and

implemented only and solely by Decedent and Dale Osder as
the only shareholders of each company and with the consent of
the other of them. N o company policies, programs,
business ventures or net income distributions were
undertaken by the Ostler Corporations without their joint
and mutual consent. All decisions and policies of both Osder
International and Osder Property Development and of the
Board of Directors of each company were contingent,
conditional and based upon the mutual consent and approval of
said shareholders. It was the understanding, agreement and
practice of each company's board of directors and each
member thereof that the business and affairs of the
company should and would be undertaken and managed
only in accordance with such mutual consent of the
company's
shareholders.
(Complaint \ 21; R. 5)(collectively referred to as the "Oral Agreements").
Gary and Dale Osder also agreed that, except upon their mutual consent and
agreement as shareholders of the Ostler Corporations, they would not "offer or provide their
shares" in the Ostler Corporations to any other person. (Complaintfflf28 & 34; R. 8 & 11).
As consideration for the Oral Agreements, Gary and Dale Osder agreed that they would
continue to maintain, operate and conduct the business of the Osder Corporations only for
their mutual financial benefit and that neither would commission, engage in or conduct any
business policy or activity to which the other did not agree. (Complaintffl[27 & 33; R. 8 &
10-11).
Prior to Gary Ostier's death, the Osder Corporations were managed, operated and
their business conducted in accordance with and pursuant to the Oral Agreements.
(Complaintfflf27 & 33; R. 8 & 10-11). Mr. Stowell alleged, and the trial court properly
accepted as true for the purpose of the Motions, that Appellees breached the Oral
Agreements after Gary Ostier's death. (Complaint 1fl| 25, 29 & 35; R. 7-8 & 11).

In December 2004, Mr. Stowell filed a Complaint against Appellees based upon
alleged breaches of the Oral Agreements. (R. 1-24). On January 20, 2005, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellees Osder Corporations filed a Motion
to Dismiss Mr. StowelTs Complaint. (R. 97-98). On January 24, 2005, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellees Dale Osder and Vyron Osder also
filed a Motion to Dismiss Mr. StowelTs Complaint. (R. 140-143).
On June 8, 2005, the trial court entered a Ruling and Order granting Appellees'
Motions to Dismiss and dismissing Mr. StowelTs claims. (R. 317-26). On July 6, 2005, Mr.
Stowell filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 327-28).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Historically, only the a board of directors - not the shareholders - governs a
corporation. Only the board of directors has the power to declare distributions (dividends),
appoint officers, set policy and approve major transactions. To provide flexibility for
closely-held corporations and, at the same time, predictability, in 1992, Utah adopted the
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-101 to -1705 (the
"Revised Act"), including Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732, to enable shareholders to usurp or
override director authority in specified circumstances.
Section 732(2)(a)&(c) of the Revised Act requires all shareholder agreements which
usurp or override director authority to be in writing, be signed by all shareholders and have a
term of only 10 years:
(2) An agreement authorized by this section shall be:
(a) set forth:

(i) in the articles of incorporation or bylaws and approved by all
persons who are shareholders at the time of the agreement; or
(ii) in a written agreement that is signed by all persons who
are shareholders at the time of the agreement and is made
known to the corporation;

(c) valid for 10 years, unless the agreement provides
otherwise.
Utah Code Ann. § 164 0a-732(2)(a)&(c) (1992) (emphasis added.)
By use of the word "shall," the plain language of Section 732(2) of the Revised Act
mandates that, to be valid, a shareholder agreement "shall" meet those three requirements.
"The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is
the plain language of the Act." Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906
(Utah 1984). Once the Court determines that the language of Section 732 is clear, an
examination of the legislative history for the purpose of determining the meaning of the
statute is unnecessary and inappropriate. See Schurt^ v. BMW'ojrN. Arn., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108,
1112 (Utah 1991) (<cWe first look to the statute's plain language. Only if we find some
ambiguity need we look further." (citations omitted)). The trial court correctly interpreted the
plain language of Section 732(2) as mandating that the Oral Agreements be in writing to be
enforceable. Because the language of Section 732 is plain and unambiguous, it is improper to
adopt Mr. StowelTs approach of looking for legislative intent outside of the statute itself.1

1

Even if Mr. StowelTs improper approach is followed, the Official Commentary to
the Revised Act confirms the Legislature's intention that the writing requirement of Section
732 is mandatory.

From an historical perspective, the logic behind Section 732 allowing shareholders of
closely-held corporations a level of flexibility in determining corporate governance becomes
clear. Corporations are creatures of statute and, in Utah, exist pursuant to the Revised Act.
The Revised Act not only authorizes the creation and maintenance of corporations, it
establishes the basic organization and management structure of corporations. Prior to
passage of the Revised Act in Utah in 1992, shareholder agreements with provisions
inconsistent with the statutory requirements of Utah's corporate code had never been
authorized either by case law or by statute. In 1992, the Utah Legislature enacted Section
732 of the Revised Act, which for the first time authorized shareholder agreements having
provisions designed to override certain requirements of Utah's corporate code.
Section 732 is not a Statute of Frauds: It is a statute that authorizes a contractual
deviation from a statutory scheme. Whereas a Statute of Frauds makes unenforceable a
contract which is otherwise is valid, Section 732 of the Revised Act operates to validate
agreements which would be unenforceable because they are contrary to the statutory scheme
and traditional rule that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority
of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board
of directors . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-801 (1992).
In other words, Section 732 creates a safe harbor to enable certain shareholder
contracts to override director authority. Mr. StowelPs arguments labor under the false
assumption that, similar to an oral agreement subject to a statute of frauds, the Oral
Agreements in this case otherwise would be valid. That assumption is false: Because the
Oral Agreements attempt to usurp or override director authority, the only way for them to
become valid is to comply with Section 732.

Section 732 goes further: It eliminates the issue as to whether an underlying
shareholder agreement overriding the statutory scheme of corporate governance is valid.
Under Section 732, if a shareholder agreement is "inconsistent" with the enumerated
instances in subsection (1), such as overriding corporate governance by a board of directors,
the shareholder agreement is invalid unless it complies with the mandatory requirements of
subsection (2): The shareholder agreement must be in a writing signed by all shareholders.
Further, pursuant to Section 732(2)(c) of the Revised Act, the Oral Agreements
terminated ten years after their formation. Nothing in the record establishes that Gary Ostler
and Dale Osder specifically agreed that the Oral Agreements would be valid beyond ten
years. By the time Mr. Stowell filed his Complaint in December 2004, both of the Oral
Agreements were more than ten years old, and therefore, had expired.
Finally, the Oral Agreements were personal to Gary Osder and Dale Ostler and
expired upon Gary Ostler's Death. The material terms of the Oral Agreements mandated
that the Ostler Corporations be managed through the mutual agreement of Gary and Dale
Osder, only for the mutual benefit of Gary and Dale Osder, and that Gary and Dale Osder
would not transfer their shares. None of those terms can be met given the death of Gary
Osder. Because the participation of Gary Osder is a material part of the Oral Agreements,
they were personal contracts that expired upon Gary Osder's death.

ARGUMENT2
Enforcement of the Oral Agreements leads to a nightmare for the future management
of the Osder Corporations and coundess other closely-held Utah corporations subject to
disputes when one of the principal shareholders transfers his or her shares though sale or
inheritance. If mere management style is elevated to the level of an enforceable shareholder
agreement, generations of future shareholders in the Ostler Corporations will be required to
manage all levels of corporate decision by unanimous consent. Fifty years from now, when
the number of shareholders has expanded, the Ostler Corporations' routine decision-making
ability will become paralyzed, as each decision will require unanimity among dozens of
shareholders with varying levels of interest, background and personal motivation. The
shareholder of a single share in the Ostler Corporations could deadlock the corporations'
management and cause their untimely demise.
Enforcement of the Oral Agreements will lead to a nightmare for the future
management of the Ostler Corporations that will make the farm animals' management of the
farm in George Orwell's

ANIMAL FARM,

by contrast, appear to be a smooth-running,

well-conceived operation.
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Dale Ostler and Vyron Osder absolutely deny that the Oral Agreements existed or
that Dale Ostler and Gary Osder ever managed the Osder Corporations under the
arrangement described in Mr. Stowell's Complaint. (Dale Osder's Affidavit in Support of
Dale Osder's and Vyron Osder's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss; R. 105-06 atffif9-15).
Yet, because the case was decided under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court properly did not consider Dale Osder's Affidavit and accepted Mr. Stowell's
allegations as true for the purpose of deciding this case under Rule 12(b)(6). For the
purposes of this Appeal, Dale Osder and Vyron Osder also will assume, for the purposes of
argument only, that Mr. Stowell's allegations in the Complaint are true.

POINT I
APPELLANT AGREES THAT ORAL AGREEMENTS
ARE SUBJECT TO SECTION 732
The parties agree that "The predominant purpose of Section 732 is to acknowledge
and validate shareholder agreements that conflict in one particular or another with other
sections of the Revised Act." Brief of Appellant at 21. Further, there is no dispute between
the parties regarding the applicability of Section 732 to the Oral Agreements: "Because the
subject shareholder agreements are inconsistent with one or more sections of the Revised
Act, they specifically fall within the contemplation of Section 732(1)." Brief of Appellant at
20; see Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition at 14.
POINT II
T H E ORAL AGREEMENTS ARE UNENFORCEABLE
BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH T H E
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 732, WHICH
REQUIRES SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TO BE
WRITTEN IF THEY OVERRIDE DIRECTOR
AUTHORITY OR OTHERWISE CONFLICT WITH
T H E REVISED ACT
The plain language of Section 732(2) of the Revised Act requires the Oral Agreements
to be in writing and signed by all shareholders. Mr. Stowell is attempting to allege, prove and
enforce unsigned and unwritten Oral Agreements. Outside of Section 732, there is no Utah
statutory or common law authority validating shareholder agreements which usurp or
override director authority or otherwise conflict with the requirements of the Revised Act.
In fact, because the Oral Agreements conflict with the governance requirements of the
Revised Act, for those Oral Agreements to be enforceable, they must be authorized under

subsection (1) of Section 732 and must comply with the formal writing and signing
requirements of subsection (2) of Section 732:
(2)

An agreement authorized by this section shall be:

(a)

Set forth:

(i)

in the articles of incorporation or bylaws and
approved by all persons who are shareholders at the time
of the agreement; or

(ii)

in a written agreement that is signed by all persons
who are shareholders at the time of the agreement and
is made known to the corporation;

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(2)(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
Section 732(2)'s use of the term "shall" indicates a mandatory requirement. See Paar v.
Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310,f7, 117 P.3d 1079 ('"Shall' is commonly understood to create a
mandatory condition." (citations omitted)). The ordinary and accepted meaning of the term
"shall" is that it indicates a mandatory action. "The word shall is ordinarily language of
command." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1966), See also Board ofEduc. of Granite Sck Dist.
v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) ("While 'shall' has been validly
interpreted as directory . . ., it is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as
such previously in this and other jurisdictions.") (citations omitted); and^tJB. v. Christean,
938 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "shall" usually is presumed mandatory)
(citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary p. 2085 (1986) (defining "shall" as
"used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory.")),
The trial court was bound to interpret Section 732(2) by the ordinary and accepted
meaning of its terms, including the mandatory "shall." Thus, Section 732(2) mandates that

shareholder agreements which depend upon Section 732 for authorization must be set forth
in writing and signed by all shareholders.
In interpreting a statute, the court should first look at the statute's plain language, only
looking further in the event of the finding of an ambiguity. See Schurt^ v. BMW ofN. Am.,
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108,1112 (Utah 1991) ('We first look to the statute's plain language. Only if
we find some ambiguity need we look further." (citations omitted)). A statute should be
interpreted to effect legislative intent: "[T)o that end, we presume that the Legislature used
each term advisedly, and we give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat. Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted).
It is improper to look for evidence of legislative intent outside of a statute's language
when the language is unambiguous. "When the language of a particular provision of a statute
is ambiguous, the Court may attempt, following principles of statutory construction, to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature; but where there is no ambiguity the plain language
of the statute must be taken as the expression of the Legislature's intent." P.I.E. Employees
Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). Because Section 732 is unambiguous, neither the trial court nor this Court should
consider any source besides Section 732's plain language to confirm that the writing
requirement is mandatory.
Mr. Stowell incorrectiy suggests that, because Section 732 does not specifically state
that shareholder agreements which do not comply with its formal requirements are invalid,
such agreements may stand on their own under traditional legal principles. See Brief of
Appellant at 16. Mr. Stowell's premise not only ignores the fact that, under traditional legal
principles, shareholder agreements which override the corporate code are invalid, it ignores

this Court's repeated holdings that where a right is governed and controlled entirely by
statute, the right cannot be successfully exercised unless the authorizing statute's formal
requirements are met.
The Court's enunciation of that principle has been most clearly stated in the area of
probate law. "[T]he right to dispose of property by will is governed and controlled entirely
by statute. Such statutes are mandatory, and, unless strictly complied with, the instrument, as
a will, is void." In re Alexander's Estate, 139 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1943). Accordingly, the
failure of a will to meet formal statutory requirements results in the invalidation of the will,
even where the statute itself does not specify a consequence for the failure of a will to
conform to its formal requirements. For example, in In re Wolcott's Estate, 180 P. 169 (Utah
1919), the Court invalidated an holographic will for its failure to comply with the authorizing
statute's formal requirements despite the fact that there was evidence that the document in
question was intended to be a will.3 Because the will in question did not meet the statutory
requirements, the Court held that "the instrument cannot be sustained as a will without
arbitrarily setting the statute aside and substituting our will for that of the Legislature. This
we have no right or power to do, however much we may appreciate the hardship incident to
a strict construction in the present case." Id. at 170. See also Taylor v. Estate ojTaylor, 770 P.2d
163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an absolute failure to comply with statute requiring
will to be signed by the testator and witnesses in one another's presence invalidated will.).

3

The statute in question provided: "An olographic will is one that is entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may
be made in or out of this state, and need not be witnessed. Such wills may be proved in the
same manner as other private writings." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6316. The statute itself
did not provide for a consequence for noncompliance with its terms.
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The principle set forth in these probate cases applies equally to Section 732 of the
Revised Act. The right to enter into a shareholder agreement which overrides requirements
of the Revised Act is a right that exists, is governed and controlled exclusively by Section
732. See Points III, IV & V, infra. Failure to comply with Section 732's formal requirements
must result in invalidation of a shareholder agreement despite the fact that Section 732 itself
does not specify a consequence for noncompliance. To hold otherwise would result in an
arbitrary setting aside of Section 732 and the Legislative intent expressed in it. See State v.
Morrison, 31 P.3d 547, 552 (Utah 2001) (holding that Court avoids statutory interpretations
that render parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous).
POINT III
SECTION 732 IS N O T A STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section 732 is not a Statute of Frauds: It is a statute that authorizes a contractual
deviation from a statutory scheme. A Statute of Frauds may invalidate an otherwise
enforceable contract. For example, the Statute of Frauds in Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (2004)
enumerates certain agreements that are void unless in writing, such as contracts that cannot
be performed in less than a year, promises to answer for the debt of another, etc. The
underlying assumption, therefore, is that the contract is enforceable unless the Statute of
Frauds invalidates it. That premise applied to Section 732 of the Revised Act, however, is
false.
In otherwords, Section 732 provides a safe harbor to enable certain shareholder
contracts to permissibly override otherwise statutory required director authority. Mr.
Stowell's arguments labor under the false assumption that, similar to an oral agreement
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subject to a statute of frauds, the Oral Agreements in this case otherwise would be valid.
That assumption is false: Because the Oral Agreements attempt to usurp or override director
authority, the only way for them to become valid is to comply fully with Section 732.
Section 732 goes further: It eliminates the issue as to whether an underlying
shareholder agreement overriding the statutory scheme of corporate governance is valid.
Under Section 732, if a shareholder agreement is "inconsistent" with the enumerated
instances in subsection (1), such as overriding corporate governance by a board of directors,
the shareholder agreement is invalid unless it complies with the mandatory requirements of
subsection (2): The shareholder agreement must be in a writing signed by all shareholders.
POINT IV
IN UTAH, CORPORATE DIRECTORS - N O T
SHAREHOLDERS AS SUCH - HAVE AUTHORITY TO
MANAGE A N D GOVERN CORPORATIONS
Traditionally, the chief hallmark of corporate structure has been the separation of
ownership from management. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-33 (Model Act - pre-1992 and
now repealed) and § 16-10a-801 (Revised Act). Shareholders own the corporation and
directors manage it, and the management powers cannot be delegated. 2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia
of the ILMW of Private Corporations (1990) § 497, p. 591; East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan,

860 P.2d 310, 313-314 (Utah 1993). "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under
the authority of. . . its board of directors . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-801(2).
Directors' powers to manage and govern the corporation include the power to
appoint officers (Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-830), declare the timing and amount of
distributions {i.e., dividends) (Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-640), and approve major transactions
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(Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1201). Historically, shareholder actions which usurped those
powers were said to "sterilize" the board of directors. Long Park, Inc. v. New Brunswick
Theatres Co., 11 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1948).
To provide flexibility for closely-held corporations and, at the same time, maintain
predictability regarding the standards for corporate organization and management, Utah
adopted the Revised Act, including Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732, to enable shareholders to
usurp or override director authority so long as certain conditions are met.
POINT V
HISTORICALLY, UTAH HAS N O T ALLOWED
SHAREHOLDERS TO USURP OR OVERRIDE
DIRECTOR AUTHORITY
Historically in Utah, there was neither statutory nor common law authority to allow
shareholder agreements to override director authority. It was only with the Utah
Legislature's enactment of Section 732 in 1992 that such shareholder agreements first
became legally recognized.
"A corporation cannot be created except as provided by statute. It is a mere creature
of law." Nat. Bank of the Republic v. Price, 234 P. 231, 236 (Utah 1923). Utah adopted its first
corporate statute in 1872, expanded it in 1888 and codified it at statehood in 1896. For 104
years - from 1888 to 1992 - Utah had a strict governance rule for Utah corporations,
namely, "The corporate powers of the corporation shall be exercised by the board of
directors."4 This requirement historically meant that the directors must personally govern

4

Compiled Laws of Utah 1888 § 2272.6; R.S. 1898 § 324; Laws, 1903, ch. 94;
Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 § 324; Compiled Laws of Utah 1917 § 871; R.S. of Utah 1933
§ 18-2-20; Utah Code § 18-2-20 (1943); Utah Code § 16-2-21 (1953); and Utah Code § 16-19-

the corporation and may not delegate their duties. See East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan,
860 P.2d 310, 313-14 (Utah 1993) (holding the board of directors and not the shareholders
control the affairs of the corporation); 2 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the haw of Private Corporations
(1990) § 497, p. 591 (explaining the traditional rule of director management).
Traditionally, shareholders in Utah corporations could not contract around the
statutory requirements of corporate governance by directors. While the issue never arose in
Utah case law, in other jurisdictions, "shareholder agreements were invalidated by courts for
a variety of reasons, including so-called 'sterilization' of the board of directors and failure to
follow the statutory norms of the applicable corporation act." Utah Corporation and
Business Law Manual with Commentary, Official Commentary To Utah Revise Business
Corporation Act, § 732, p. 731 (2005 ed.) (citing"LongPark, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick
Theatres Co., 11 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1948).
The Utah Supreme Court indicated its adherence to this traditional rule from an early
date: "[A]uthority to manage and control the corporation and conduct its business is left
exclusively to the board of directors and not to the stockholders as such." Anderson v.
GrantsvilleN. Willow Irrigation Co., 169 P. 168, 169 (Utah 1917). Prior to the enactment of the
Revised Act, there was no Utah case law indicating that, through agreement, shareholders
could override director authority or other aspects of the statutory scheme.
In 1961, Utah adopted the Model Business Corporation Act (the "Model Act") as its
corporate statute. Utah's adoption of the Model Act did not change Utah's rule mandating
management of a corporation by its directors. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-33 (1961) ("The

10-33 (1961).
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business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by the board of directors."). Nor did
Utah's Model Act authorize shareholder override of statutory requirements through
shareholder agreements.
From sometime in the 1950s to 1992, there was agitation from some quarters for
more flexibility in corporate statutes to accommodate shareholder agreements, especially in
regard to closely held corporations. See Harlan W. Murray, editor, A Plea for Separate Statutory
Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 700 (1958). In fact, some of this criticism
was directed at Utah's corporate act:
[The Model Act as adopted in Utah] does not provide for
flexible shareholder's agreements . . . . Shareholders in a close
corporation usually act as both directors and officers, owners
and managers; among themselves they are considered partners.
It seems logical therefore, that as partners, they be allowed
broad prerogatives in making agreements that will benefit the
business without having to act under the express tide of
directors. Yet agreements among shareholders pertaining
to management functions have been struck down as being
violative of the directors' prerogatives since most statutes
state that corporate affairs will be managed only by the
board of directors.
Grant S. Kesler, Comment, The Need for Legislative Recognition of Utah's Close Corporation,
1970 Utah L. Rev. 270, 276-77 (emphasis added). Despite this criticism, until 1992, neither
the Utah Legislature nor the Utah courts authorized shareholders, by agreement, to override
the statutory requirements for management by directors. In fact, prior to 1992, Utah opted
not to adopt proposed revisions to the Model Business Corporation Act that were
promulgated to allow certain types of shareholder agreements under certain circumstances.
See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. v.3 p. 113-14 (1971) (adding thereto Sections 34 and 35).
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POINT VI
OVER T H E YEARS, SOME STATES ALLOWED
CERTAIN SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TO
OVERRIDE DIRECTOR AUTHORITY BUT A SPLIT
OF DECISIONS RESULTED
In the years before statutes such as Section 732 became common place, some courts
allowed shareholders, by agreement, to override certain provisions of corporate statutes in
certain limited situations.5 For example, in Gallerv. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964), the
Illinois Supreme Court ordered specific performance of a shareholders' agreement that
provided for salary and dividend payments to the shareholders as well as their families. The
Illinois court enforced that agreement in Galler despite the absence of any statutory
authorization allowing shareholders to override the statutory requirement that the
corporation be managed by its directors.
The development of statutory6 and common law authorizations for shareholder
agreements to override the requirements of corporate codes remained sporadic and
uncertain. In fact, in 1972 an Illinois Appellate Court rejected the argument that the Illinois
Supreme Court's ruling in Galler permitted a shareholder agreement to amend corporate bylaws despite contrary statutory language: "Slight deviations from corporate norms may be

5

See e.g. DeBoy v. Harris, 113 A.2d 903 (Md. 1955) (upholding pre-incorporation
shareholder agreement concerning division of profits); Rqyster v. Baker, 365 S.W.2d 496 (Mo.
1963) (upholding a shareholder agreement allowing majority of shareholders to manage
corporation); and Welchman v. Koschm% 91 A.2d 169 (N.J. 1952) (upholding shareholder
agreement delineating stock redemption requirements).
6

Before Section 732 was promulgated, some states enacted statutes which authorized
shareholder agreements that affect corporate governance. See e.g. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 350
(1974); 111. Rev. Stat. Ch. 32 § 1211 (1983); and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-7210 (1981).
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permitted. However, action by the shareholders which is in direct contravention of the
statute cannot be allowed." Somers v. AAA

Temp, Services, Inc., 284 N.E.2d 462, 465 (111. Ct.

App. 1972).7
POINT VII
SECTION 732 WAS ENACTED TO ALLOW
FLEXIBILITY A N D PREDICTABILITY IN
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES FOR CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS
Until the Utah Legislature's enactment of the Revised Act in 1992, shareholders in
Utah corporations had neither statutory nor common law authorization to override the
statutory requirements for corporate governance, such as the absolute management authority
of the board of directors. By adopting Section 732, the Utah Legislature changed the
traditional law regarding shareholder agreements:
Rather than relying on further uncertain and sporadic
development of the law [relating to the validity of shareholder
agreements] in the courts, section 732 . . . rejects the older
line of cases [refusing to enforce shareholder agreements].
It adds an important element of predictability previously
absent from the Model Act and affords participants in

7

See also McDonald v. Dalheim, 683 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (invalidating a
shareholder agreement that divested directors of their authority to manage the corporation);
In re Petrol Terminal Corp., 120 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1954) (invalidating shareholder
agreement providing that shareholder would be employed by corporation for 20 years); and
Roberts v. San Jacinto Shipbuilders, Inc., 198 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (invalidating
shareholder agreement which mandated employment and salary requirements in relation to a
certain individual).
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closely-held corporations greater contractual freedom to
tailor the rules of their enterprise. The drafters have elected
to add section 732 of the Model Act to the Revised Act.
Official Commentary to the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, § 732 p. 338 (emphasis
added).8
Under the traditional rule regarding shareholder agreements, the Oral Agreements
would have been invalid as impermissibly conflicting with the Utah corporate code. Absent
the authorization of Section 732, Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler (as shareholders) had no
authority to contractually override the statutory scheme set forth in the Revised Act (or,
before 1992, the Model Act). It is only through the Legislative authorization in Section
732(1) that shareholder agreements of the type Mr. Stowell attempts to rely upon may exist.
Mr. Stowell apparently agrees:
The predominant purpose of Section 732 is to
acknowledge and validate shareholder agreements that
conflict in one particular or another with other sections of
the Revised Act.
Brief of Appellant at 21 (emphasis added).

8

In 1984, the Committee on Business Corporations of the Section of Corporations
of the American Bar Association (the "ABA Committee") promulgated the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act as a comprehensive restatement of the Model Business
Corporation Act Richard A. Booth, A Chronology of the Evolution of the MBCA, 56 Bus. Law
63, 66 (2000). In 1990, the ABA Committee promulgated Section 7.32 as an amendment to
the Revised Model Act to allow shareholder agreements that affect statutory corporate
governance requirements under certain circumstances. In 1992, Utah adopted the Revised
Model Act, including Section 7.32 of the Model Revised Act, which became Section 732 of
the Utah Revised Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-101 to -1705.
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POINT VIII
T H E ORAL AGREEMENTS IN THIS CASE
CONFLICT I N NUMEROUS WAYS WITH UTAH'S
REVISED ACT
There was no dispute before the trial court that the Oral Agreements conflict with the
management provisions of the Revised Act. For example, the Oral Agreements eliminate
many duties of the board of directors of the Ostier Corporations. Section 801 of the Revised
Act provides:
(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-732, each corporation
must have a board of directors.
(2) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of, and the business and affairs of the
corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of
incorporation or in an agreement authorized under Section
16-10a-732.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-801 (1992) (emphasis added). In direct conflict with Section 801 of
the Revised Act, the Oral Agreements specifically provide "that all policy of the company
would be adopted and implemented and the company managed, operated and its business
conducted only upon and pursuant to the mutual consent and agreement of the company's
shareholders." (R. 8 at ^f 27). This Court need not look beyond the Revised Act itself to
determine that only by Section 732 is an agreement cognizable.
There are several other ways in which the Oral Agreements conflict with the Revised
Act's requirements, something Mr. Stowell admits. See Brief of Appellant at 20; and
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition at 14.
Distributions to Shareholders: The Revised Act provides that a A board of
directors may authorize and the corporation may make distributions to its
-25-

shareholders subject to any restriction in the articles of incorporation and the
limitations in Subsection (3)." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-640(l). Indirect
conflict with the Revised Act, the Oral Agreements provide, "All policy and
practices for the operation of [the Ostler Corporations], including the conduct
of the business of each company and the making of net income distributions
to shareholders of each company was formulated and implemented only and
solely by [Gary Osder] and Dale Ostler as the only shareholders of each
company and with the consent of the other of them." (Complaint ^f 21; R. 45)Filling Vacancies in the Board: The Revised Act provides that the
remaining directors may fill a vacancy on the board. See Utah Code Ann. § 1610a-810(l). In direct conflict with the Revised Act, Mr. Stowell alleges that it
is a breach of the Oral Agreements for the remaining director (after Gary
Osder's death) to have "nominated, appointed or elected one or more
members of the Board of Directors of [the Osder Corporations] without prior
notice to, consulting and obtaining the agreement of [Mr. Stowell]."
(Complaint 1J25; R. 6-7).
Compensation of Directors: The Revised Act provides that "[T]he board of
directors may fix the compensation of directors." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a811. In direct conflict with the Revised Act, the Oral Agreements provide,
"All decisions and policies of the [Osder Corporations] and of the Board of
Directors of each company were contingent, conditional and based upon the
mutual consent and approval of [Dale Ostler and Gary Ostler as shareholders].
(Complaint U 21; R. 4-5).
As to each of the preceding categories, the Model Act contains similar provisions which are
inconsistent with the Oral Agreements.
Mr. Stowell acknowledges that the Oral Agreements are subject to Section 732, yet he
argues that those Agreements need not comply with Section 732fs formal requirements. In
effect, Mr. Stowell asks the Court to ignore the requirements Section 732(2). His request is
contrary to standard principles of statutory construction.
" A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and
is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently,
each part or section should be construed in connection
with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole/" We follow '"the cardinal rule that the
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general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control,
and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and
harmonious to its manifest object.'"
Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1]17, 66 P.3d 592 (citations omitted).
POINT IX
T H E OFFICIAL COMMENTARY TO SECTION 732
INDICATES THAT T H E LEGISLATURE I N T E N D E D
SECTION 732's WRITING REQUIREMENT TO BE
MANDATORY, WHICH SUPPORTS APPELLEES'
POSITION AND UNDERMINES APPELLANT'S
THEORY OF THIS CASE
Mr. Stowell suggests that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Section 732
because it failed to take legislative intent into account. Specifically, Mr. Stowell argues that
an isolated portion of the Official Commentary should be taken as evidence that Section
732(2)'s writing requirement is not mandatory and that the trial court was in error. See Brief
of Appellant at 15-20.
The Court does not need to divine legislative intent from isolated portions of the
Official Commentary where the plain language of Section 732 is unambiguous. "The best
evidence of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain
language of the Act." Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984).
Even taking Mr. Stowell's improper approach and moving beyond the plain language
of the Revised Act, it remains clear that the Legislature intended Section 732(2)'s writing
requirement to be mandatory. The Official Commentary is exceptionally clear in regard to
the mandatory nature of the writing requirement for those agreements that depend upon
Section 732 for validation:
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An agreement can be validated under section 732 whether it is
set forth in the articles of incorporation, the bylaws or in a
separate agreement, and whether or not section 732 is
specifically referenced in the agreement. The principal
requirements are simply that the agreement be in writing
and be approved or agreed to by all persons who are then
shareholders.
Utah Corporation and Business Law Manual with Commentary, Official Commentary To
Utah Revise Business Corporation Act, § 732(2), p. 346-48 (2005 ed.) (emphasis added).
Mr. Stowell bases his claim that the trial court erred upon Mr. Stowell's
misunderstanding of a small portion of the Official Commentary, which states:
Section 732(1) defines the range of permissible subject matter
for shareholder agreements largely by illustration, enumerating
seven types of agreements that are expressly validated to the
extent they would not be valid absent section 732. The
enumeration of these types of agreements is not exclusive; nor
should it give rise to a negative inference that an agreement of a
type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories of
section 732(1) is. ipso facto, a type of agreement that is not valid
unless it complies with section 732.
Official Commentary at 338 (emphasis added).
When the Official Commentary is examined as a whole, it becomes clear that the
language Mr. Stowell cites is simply a restatement of the principle that a shareholder
agreement need only comply with Section 732 when it conflicts with another provision of
Revised Act:
Section 732 supplements the other provisions of the Model Act
and Revised Act. If an agreement is not in conflict with another
section of the Revised Act, no resort need be made to section
732. with its requirement of unanimity. For example, special
provisions can be included in the articles of incorporation or
bylaws with less than unanimous shareholder agreement so long
as such provisions are not in conflict with other provisions of
the Revised Act. Similarly, Section 732 would not have to be
-28-

relied upon to validate typical buy-sell agreements among two or
more shareholders or the covenants and other terms of a stock
purchase agreement entered into in connection with the
issuance of shares by a corporation.
The types of provisions validated by section 732 are many and
varied. Section 732(1) defines the range of permissible subject
matter for shareholder agreements largely by illustration,
enumerating seven types of agreements that are expressly
validated to the extent they would not be valid absent section
732. The enumeration of these types of agreements is not
exclusive; nor should it give rise to a negative inference that an
agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by one of the
categories of Section 732(1) is, ipso facto, a type of agreement
that is not valid unless is complies with Section 732. Section
732(1) also contain a "catch all" which adds a measure of
flexibility to the seven enumerated categories.

Subsection (1) is the heart of section 732. It states that certain
types of agreements are effective among the shareholders and
the corporation even if inconsistent with another provision of
the Revised Act. Thus, an agreement authorized by Section 732
is, by virtue of that section, "not inconsistent with law" within
the meaning of sections 202(2)(b) and 206(2) of the Revised
Act. In contrast a shareholder agreement that is not
inconsistent with any provisions of the Revised Act is not
subject to the requirements of section 732.
Official Commentary (emphasis added).
The particular phrase upon which Mr. Stowell bases his argument simply explains that
just because a shareholder agreement may be pigeonholed into one or more of Section
732(l)'s enumerated examples does not mean that the shareholder agreement must comply
with the remainder of Section 732. In other words, agreements of the type enumerated in
Section 732(1) must comply with Section 732(2) only if they are "inconsistent with one or
more provisions of [the Revised Act]." Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-732(l). Thus, the Official
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Commentary provides: Section 732(l)'s enumerated list of permissible shareholder
agreement subject matter should not give rise to a "negative inference that an agreement of a
type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories of Section 732(1) is, ipso facto, a
type of agreement that is not valid unless is complies with Section 732." Id.
The test in determining whether a shareholder agreement must comply with the
writing and signing requirements of Section 732(2) is not whether the shareholder agreement
is embraced by one of the categories of Section 731(1): Instead, the test is whether the
shareholder agreement is inconsistent with any provision of the Revised Act. For example, a
shareholder agreement might be embraced by Section 732(1) (h) because it "governs . . . the
relationship among shareholders . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(l)(h)„ It is conceivable
that the provisions in some such agreements, however, may not conflict with any provision
of the Revised Act. Absent a conflict or attempt to alter the statutory scheme, the
requirements of Section 732(2) may not apply. Yet, since the Oral Agreements do conflict
with the Revised Act, they must comply with Section 732(2).
POINT X
ALTHOUGH INCORPORATED FOUR YEARS PRIOR
TO UTAH'S ENACTMENT OF SECTION 732, T H E
ORAL AGREEMENT FOR OSTLER
INTERNATIONAL, INC., IS SUBJECT TO SECTION
732.
The trial court correctly held that the Revised Act, including Section 732, applied to
Ostler International, Inc., and the Oral Agreement under which Mr. Stowell alleges it was
managed, despite the fact that the corporation and the alleged Oral Agreement was formed
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in 1988 (R. 2-3 at If 8) - prior to the enactment of the Revised Act in 1992.9 The Revised
Act states:
[T]his chapter applies to all domestic corporations in existence
on July 1,1992, that were incorporated under any general statute
of this state providing for incorporation of corporations for
profit, and to actions taken by the directors, officers, and
shareholders of such corporations after July 1,1992.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1701 (1992) (emphasis added).
The Official Commentary to Section 1701 removes any possible doubt regarding the
Revised Act's application to all Utah corporations for profit regardless of incorporation date:
The fundamental principle underlying section 1701 is that the
Revised Act should ultimately be made fully applicable to all
existing business corporations as well as to all new business
corporations formed after the effective date of the new statute.
It is undesirable to "grandfather" existing corporations under
earlier statutes since that results in the permanent coexistence of
two different and overlapping systems of corporation law, with
resulting confusion. This is particularly true of the Revised Act,
which, having been based on the Revised Model Act, builds
direcdy on the experience of many years with existing
corporations statutes and contains few major substantive
changes.
Section 1701 applies this basic principle by making the Revised
Act applicable as of its "effective date" (prescribed in section
1706) to all domestic corporations formed under general
statutes for corporations for profit, subject to specified
limitations. This includes all prior general business corporations
or associations, or corporations formed for the purpose of
engaging in a business for which the state has provided a
separate incorporation procedure.

9

Osder Property Development, Inc., was incorporated in 1993, after the effective
date of the Revised Act, eliminating any issue concerning the applicability of the Revised Act
to that corporation and the Oral Agreement under which it was allegedly managed.
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The application of the Revised Act to existing corporations is
limited to preserve certain provisions that were thought to be
particularly important to the protection of existing shareholder
expectations and rights. See the commentary to section 1703.
Official Commentary to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1701 (emphasis added).
Mr. Stowell now implies that, because Ostler International was incorporated in 1988 four years before the Revised Act was enacted - the Revised Act should not apply to the
Oral Agreement for Ostler International. Brief of Appellant at 13-14. Before the trial court,
Mr. Stowell argued that because the Revised Act states that it applies "to actions taken by the
directors, officers, and shareholders of such corporations after July 1,1992," (R. 195-06),
Section 732 of the Revised Act does not apply to the Oral Agreement for Ostler
International because that corporation was formed prior to July 1,1992. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-1701. That proposition directly conflicts with the purpose and intent of Section
1701. Moreover, if Mr. Stowell's proposition were accepted, that the Oral Agreement for
Ostler International was in existence from 1988 - the beginning of that corporation's
existence — then there was no statutory authorization for such an agreement. Accordingly,
the alleged Oral Agreement would be void as contrary to the statutory scheme at that time,
i.e., that only the Board of Directors could manage that corporation.
Section 1701 indicates that the Revised Act replaced existing corporate law for all
Utah for-profit corporations - existing and yet to be formed. The Utah Legislature made an
express determination not to "grandfather" existing corporations under the old corporate law
regime. See id.
The only exceptions to the applicability of the Revised Act to all corporations for
profit are contained in Section 1704's saving provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1704
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(1992). Section 1704 does not provide an exception of the application of Section 732 to
corporations incorporated before the Revised Act went into effect, nor does it except from
the Revised Act shareholder agreements that were formed prior to 1992. Section 732
establishes the legal standard applicable to the formation of valid shareholder agreements,
including shareholder agreements in pre-Revised Act corporations. As the trial court
correctly found, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Section 1704's saving
provisions apply in any fashion to the Ostler Corporations or the alleged Oral Agreements.
(R. 321).
POINT XI
RECENT CASES IN MAINE AND CONNECTICUT
CONFIRM SECTION 732's WRITING REQUIREMENT
FOR SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS
Recently, courts in two other states have confirmed the writing requirement of
Section 732(2). The most significant decision comes from the Supreme Court of Maine. In
Villar v. Kernan, 695 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1997), the Supreme Court of Maine considered the issue
of whether "Maine law, including but not limited to 13-A M.R.S.A. § 618 [the equivalent of
Utah's Section 732], precludefs] an action for breach of an oral contract between two
shareholders of a closely held corporation prohibiting their receipt of salaries from the
corporation?" Villar, 695 A.2d at 1222.
In Villar, Mr. Kernan and Mr. Villar were shareholders in a pizza business. See id.
According to Mr. Kernan, he had an oral shareholder agreement with Mr. Villar specifying
that they would never receive salaries from the pizza business. See id. After Mr. Kernan
began receiving consulting fees from the pizza business, Mr. Villar filed a federal lawsuit
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alleging breach of the oral shareholder agreement. See id. The federal district court
questioned whether Maine's shareholder agreement statute prohibited enforcement of an oral
shareholder agreement and, if not, whether the Kernan-Villar shareholder agreement could
be enforced in equity. See id. at 1222-23. Finding no controlling precedent, the federal trial
court certified the question for review by the Maine Supreme Court. See id.
In response, the Maine Supreme Court noted that "Section 618 operates to validate
agreements that would be unenforceable under traditional notions of acceptable corporate
practice." Id. at 1223. Using simple principles of statutory interpretation that do not differ
from those used in Utah, the Maine Supreme Court held that "Because the agreement must
rely upon section 618 for its validity and falls within the validating provision of section
618(1). it must meet the section's specifications and therefore must be in writing to be
enforceable." Id. at 1224 (emphasis added).10
At the time of Villar, Maine's corporate code was based on an earlier version of the
Model Act, but was phrased slightly different than, but substantially similar to, the Revised

10

The Maine Supreme Court went a step further and held that any agreement
affecting a corporation in a way addressed by Maine's section 618(1), which is similar to
Utah's Section 732(1), whether the agreement conflicted with another portion of the Maine
corporate code or not, had to comply with section 618, including the writing requirement. See
Villar, 695 A.2d at 1224 n.3. In this aspect of its holding, the Maine Supreme Court
concerned the very section of Revised Model Act Official Commentary upon which Mr.
Stowell bases his appeal in this case: "[T]he enumeration of these types of agreements is not
exclusive; nor should it give rise to the negative inference that an agreement of a type that is
or might be embraced by one of the categories . . . is, ipso facto, a type of agreement that is
not valid unless it complies with [that] section . . . ."). Id. (citing 2 Model Business
Corporation Act Ann. 7-246 (1996)). Accordingly, the Maine Supreme Court interpreted
this portion of the Revised Model Act Official Commentary in the same manner as do
Appellees: Under the Revised Act, a shareholder agreement only need comply with Section
732 if it conflicts with another provision of the Revised Act, regardless of whether the
shareholder agreement affects the corporation in a manner set forth in Section 732(1).
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Model Act's Section 7.32 and Utah's Section 732.11 Maine's shareholder agreement statute at
the time of Villar provided that no written shareholder agreement which conflicts with other
sections of Maine's corporate code or that restricts the powers of the board of directors will
be considered invalid so long as such agreement is either set forth in the articles of
incorporation or is subscribed to in writing by all shareholders. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit.
13-A, § 618.
The approach taken by the Maine Supreme Court in Villar is the same approach the
Court should take in this case. In this case, the Oral Agreements must invoke Section 732
for validation because, under traditional, pre-Revised Act, corporate law, they would have
been invalid. The Oral Agreements are only valid if they come under the safe harbor
established by Section 732. The plain language of Section 732(2) mandates that any
authorized shareholder agreement shall be written.
In another case, the Appellate Court of Connecticut enforced a written shareholder
agreement that complied with the Connecticut equivalent of Section 732. In Fairfax
Properties, Inc. v. Lyons, 806 A.2d 535 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002), the Court held that a shareholder
resolution, signed by all of the shareholders, and providing for the method for the election of
a seventh director, was an enforceable contract because the writing complied with Section
33-717(b) of Connecticut's corporate code. See id. at 545. Section 33-717(b) of the
Connecticut corporate code comes from Revised Model Act § 7.32 and is identical, or nearly
identical, to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(b). See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-717 (1997).

11

In 2001, Maine adopted the Revised Model Act's shareholder agreement statute as
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 13-C, § 743. Accordingly, Maine's shareholder agreement statute is
now identical, or nearly identical, to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732.
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POINT XII
D U E TO T H E 10-YEAR LIMIT OF SECTION 732, T H E
ORAL AGREEMENTS EXPIRED A N D BECAME
UNENFORCEABLE N O LATER T H A N 2003
Based on Section 732(2)(c), the Oral Agreements expired before Mr Stowell filed his
Complaint in this case. Osder International was incorporated in 1988 and Ostier Property
was incorporated in 1993. (R. 2-3 atfflf8 and 9). If the Oral Agreements were in existence
from the beginning of the corporations, as suggested (Brief of Appellant at 13-14), then both
of the Oral Agreements were more than ten years old by the time Mr. Stowell filed his
Complaint on December 15, 2004.
Section 732(2)(c) contains a default time limitation applicable to shareholder
agreements:
(2)

An agreement authorized by this section shall be:

(c)

valid for 10 years, unless the agreement provides
otherwise.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(2)(c) (emphasis added).
The trial correcdy held that, even if there were shareholder agreements that were valid
despite the fact that they were not in writing, those agreements expired after 10 years because
there was no agreement to extend the default time duration established by Section 732(2)(c).
(R. 322-23).
There is no allegation in the Complaint and, therefore, absolutely nothing in the
record to suggest that Gary Osder and Dale Osder specifically agreed that the Oral
Agreements would be valid for more than ten years. Recognizing that the record does not
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establish a specific term regarding duration as required by Section 732(2)(c), Mr. Stowell
suggests that because there was no term specified in the agreements, it should be inferred
that they were to last beyond 10 years. Essentially, Mr. Stowell is asking the Court to write
into the Oral Agreements a contractual provision that even he does not allege existed. Such
a request is improper: "A court will not enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the
contract itself." RioAlgom Corp. v. ]imco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
Further, this Court has instructed that, "[i]n an attempt to give effect to the intent of
the parties, the settled rule is that if a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law
implies that it shall be done within a reasonable time under the circumstances." Coulter &
Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). "An implied
reasonable time limit is as much a part of the agreement as those terms that are expressed."
Id. In this case the reasonable time limit that the law should imply is 10 years, as clearly
mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(2)(c).
POINT XIII
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRE SECTION 732
TO BE FOLLOWED, N O T IGNORED
By affirming the trial court's ruling, the Court will advance several important policy
objectives.
A. Notice of Deviations from the Statutory Standards for Corporate
Governance.
The enforcement Section 732(2)(a)'s writing requirement fulfills the fundamental
objective of providing shareholders, the corporation, prospective shareholders and their
advisors with notice of shareholder agreements which override statutory requirements.
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Notice of shareholder agreements is an important concept built into Section 732.12 Without
clear requirements of notice, complicated questions arise concerning enforceability of the
shareholder agreement against the corporation and against transferees of shares subject to
the shareholder agreement. Enforcement of Section 732(2)(a)'s writing requirement will
provide certainty that the corporation, its shareholders, prospective shareholders and their
advisors are aware not only of the existence of a shareholder agreement, but of the
agreement's specific provisions.
B. Predictability
Enforcing the writing requirement of Section 732(2)(a), will also ensure that
shareholder agreements have predictable results. Adding predictability to shareholder
agreements was one of the Legislature's original goals in enacting Section 732:
[Section 732] adds an important element of predictability
previously absent form the Model Act and affords participants
in closely-held corporations greater contractual freedom to tailor
the rules of their enterprise.
Official Commentary at 338.
Corporate structure, functioning and management organization is predictable because
the Revised Act contains express provisions concerning each of these areas. Directors,

12

Beside requiring that shareholder agreements be contained either in the articles of
incorporation, the bylaws or in a writing signed by all shareholders, Section 732 also requires
that the existence of the shareholder agreement be noted conspicuously on the front and
back of each outstanding share certificate. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(3). The share
certificates for the Ostler Corporations have no such notations, but that was not a fact relied
upon by the trial court because its decision was limited to the allegations contained in the
Complaint. 5V* Affidavit of Dale Ostler (R. 104-112).
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officers, shareholders, prospective shareholders and their advisors may all refer to the
Revised Act for written guidance on corporate organization and management structure.
If shareholders are allowed to orally modify the requirements of the Revised Act, then
the predictability created by the Revised Act is destroyed. The predictability regarding
corporate organization and management provided by the Revised Act should be preserved
for those corporations subject to shareholder agreements which override the Revised Act's
requirements. Enforcement of Section 732's writing requirement accomplishes this
important objective. By requiring that shareholder agreements which override the Revised
Act's requirements be written, the predictability and consistency of corporations is preserved,
both as among shareholders and as between states with similar statutes. Whether a
corporation is governed traditionally, according to the Revised Act, or untraditionally,
according to a shareholder agreement, there will be a writing to ensure that the functioning
of the corporation is predictable.
Further, the predictability and clarity brought about by the enforcement of Section
732(2)(a)'s plain language writing and signing requirements will improve judicial economy by
preventing oral agreements that depend upon Section 732 for authorization from being the
subject of litigation. If shareholders orally can modify without limit the requirements of the
Revised Act, the doors to the courthouse will be open to many new types of claims that will
be based upon nothing more than allegations of supposed oral agreements.
C. Elimination of Evidentiary Issues
Similarly, enforcing the plain language of Section 732(2)(a) will streamline the
evidentiary questions presented by disputes over shareholder agreements. Written
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shareholder agreements establish a foundation for determining which shareholders entered
into the contract, as well as the contract's provisions, date and the duration Written
shareholder agreements also invoke the evidentiary benefits of the parol evidence rule.
Unwritten shareholder agreements are easy to allege after the death of a shareholder,
allegations fraught with the same peril as transactions subject to a Statute of Frauds.13
D. Elimination of Conflicts with Other Public Policy Concerns
Enforcement of Section 732?s formal requirements ensures that shareholder
agreements do not conflict with other areas of public policy. In enacting Section 732, the
Legislature granted shareholders in corporations an unusual right: It enabled shareholders to
contract around some statutory requirements. However, the unusual right allowed by the
Legislature is not without limits. Section 732 establishes a limited safe harbor within which
shareholders can exercise their right to override statutory requirements. Section 732(1)
establishes the limits of Section 732's safe harbor, with the outer boundary being that
shareholders may not override requirements of the Revised Act in a manner which would be
contrary to public policy. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(l)(h).
E. The Difficulties Associated With Adopting Mr. StowelPs Analysis
Mr. Stowell argues that shareholder agreements, even those that override the statutory
requirements of the Revised Act, may be valid under principles of ordinary contract law;

13

"The object of the statute of frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations, depending for their evidencing support on the unassisted
memory of witnesses, by requiring certain designated contracts and transactions to be
evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged and not for purpose of promoting
fraud or aiding an individual in the perpetration of hand" Joseph E. Seagram &Sons, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 310 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Or. 1962) (citations omitted).
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independent of compliance with Section 732?s formal requirements. Brief of Appellant at 16.
Under Mr. S to well's reasoning, Section 732 and its limited safe harbor become meaningless.14
This is contrary to the Court's rule of statutory construction, which gives effect to every
word in a statute, and avoids interpretations that render parts or words in a statute
inoperative or superfluous. See State v. Morrison, 31 P.3d 547, 552 (Utah 2001) ("Indeed, any
interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be
avoided." (citation omitted)). Shareholders would be free to contractually override or ignore
the Revised Act's reporting requirements, its fiduciary duty requirements, or its creditor
protection requirements and any other requirement of the Revised Act, so long as their
agreement passes muster under simple contract law.
The Court's enforcement of the plain language of Section 732 will ensure that
shareholder agreements which override statutory corporate governance provisions are kept
within the limited bounds established by the Legislature, as well as within the bounds of
predictability.
Public policy will be best served by the Court affirming of the trial court's dismissal of
Mr. Stowell's claims.

14

"CA statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one
general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.' We
follow 'the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall
control, and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest
object."' Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,1J17, 66 P.3d 592 (citations omitted).

POINT XIV
T H E ORAL AGREEMENTS ARE PERSONAL
SERVICE CONTRACTS A N D EXPIRED O N DEATH
OF GARY OSTLER I N 2003
If the Oral Agreements are accepted at face value, two brothers formed their business
in corporate form, together bore the risks and rewards, and together managed the
corporations based upon their unique, shared mutual experience and expertise which made
them successful. So far, that portion of the claim seems plausible.
The next portion of the alleged Oral Agreements, however, is incredible. Mr. Stowell
alleges the agreement to jointly manage the corporations is inheritable and assignable.
Despite the skill and expertise necessary for the successful continuation of the enterprise, the
brothers agreed that their agreement of joint management could be transferred to the
personal representative of their estate, essentially an attorney with a different skill set than the
one that made the Ostler Corporations successful. From Dale Ostler's perspective, Mr.
Stowell is a stranger chosen at random, with litde or no business background and not even an
allegation of the necessary skills for the agreed upon task.
It is as if the parties agreed that a famous painter, say Picasso, agreed to paint a
commissioned painting, but died in the middle of the project. To suggest that Picasso's
personal representative should finish the project seems absurd at best. Mr. StowelTs claim in
this case is similar to suggesting that this Court place Picasso's paint brush in his hand.
It is a longstanding principle of law that contracts that are personal in nature cannot
be assigned or inherited:
If the acts to be performed [under a contract] are stricdy
personal in nature, or if the subject matter of the contract is
such that its performance depends upon the continued existence

of a particular person or of a particular condition or status
which goes to the very essence of the contract, then there is
necessarily an implied condition that death will terminate the
contract....
McDanielv. Rose, 153 S.W. 2d 828, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941). Utah law dictates that a contract
is personal in nature "where the personal needs, characteristics or personality of the obligee
are dominant factors in the reason for contracting . . . ." Clark v. Shelton, 584 P.2d 875, 877
(Utah 1978).
The alleged Oral Agreements were personal to Dale Ostler and Gary Ostler,
obligating them only to each other. Personal contracts cannot be assigned or inherited
because the personal involvement of the contracting parties is an essential part of the
contract. The trial court's determination that the Oral Agreements were personal contracts
that expired upon Gary Ostler's death should be upheld because those agreements required
the participation of only Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler and existed for their exclusive benefit.
It is impossible for the terms of the Oral Agreements to be fulfilled in the absence of Gary
Ostler.
A.

The Shareholder Agreements Were Personal to Dale Ostler and Gary
Ostler Because They Demanded the Participation of Only Gary Ostler
and Dale Ostler and Existed for the Benefit of Only Gary Ostler and
Dale Ostler

The facts, as alleged by Mr. Stowell, stand as an admission that the Oral Agreements
are personal services contracts:
•

All policy and practice for the operation of the Ostler Corporations was to be
formulated and implemented only and solely by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler.
No company policies, programs, business ventures or net income distributions
were undertaken without the joint mutual consent of Gary Ostler and Dale
Ostler. (Complaint If 21; R. 4-5);

•

The shares of capital stock in the Ostler Corporations owned by Gary Ostler
and Dale Ostler would not be transferred to any third-party. (Complaint f 22;
R. 5); and

•

The Ostler Corporations would be maintained and operated exclusively for the
mutual financial benefit of Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler (Complaint ]f 27; R. 78).

Essentially, according to Mr. Stowell, Dale Ostler and Gary Ostler agreed to govern
and run both Ostler Corporations as equal partners with complete and exclusive joint
authority to govern.
B.

The Oral Agreements Expired At Gary Ostler's Death

The "subject matter of the [shareholder agreements] is such that [their] performance
depends upon the continued existence of a particular person or of a particular condition or
status which goes to the very essence of the contract." McDanielv. Rose, 153 S.W. 2d 828,
830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Gary Ostler's death irreparably frustrated the purpose and subject
matter of the Oral Agreements. Accordingly, "there is necessarily an implied condition that
death will terminate the contract. . . ." Id.
Upon Gary Ostler's death, the Oral Agreements were impossible to perform. "The
doctrine of impossibility of performance is one by which a party may be relieved of
performing an obligation under a contract where supervening events, unforeseeable at the
time the contract is made, render performance of the contract impossible." Holmgrem v. UtahIdaho Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978). Performance of an agreement can be
excused under a theory of impossibility due to the death of a party to a personal services
contract, due to the performance being made illegal by an intervening statute and/or due to
frustration of purpose. See generally 24 Am Jur 2d Proof of Facts § 3; 18 Williston on
Contracts §1931 (3d ed.).

Gary Ostier's death made performance of the principal and material terms of the Oral
Agreements literally impossible. Because Gary Osder died, neither Osder International nor
Osder Property can be managed only through the mutual consent of Dale Osder and Gary
Osder . Because Gary Osder died, shares must necessarily be transferred to third-parties:
Gary Ostier's heirs, for instance. Finally, because Gary Ostier died, the Ostier Corporations
cannot be managed for the exclusive mutual financial benefit of Gary Osder and Dale Ostier.
Gary Ostier's heirs would be precluded from doing so under the Oral Agreements.
C.

The Oral Agreements Are Not Assignable or Inheritable

Because of their nature, personal services contracts are not inheritable or assignable,
are not eligible for equitable treatment under the doctrine of partial performance and are not
subject to the equitable remedy of specific performance. See Thurston v. Box Elder County,
892 P.2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 1995) (explaining that personal services contracts are not usually
subject to specific performance and setting forth the reasons why); Cobabe v. Stanger,
844 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1992) (explaining that personal services contracts are not assignable
and that other party cannot be forced to accept the personal services of a substitute); Dolt^ v.
Harris &Assocs., 280 F. Supp.2d 377, 388 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (stating that doctrine of partial
performance does not apply to personal services contracts).
Personal service contracts are not assignable or inheritable because the performance
bargained for cannot be performed by an assignee or heir. No matter how capable Mr.
Stowell or Gary Ostler's heirs may be of running the Ostier Corporations, they are incapable
of providing Gary Ostier's special vision, knowledge, judgment, skill and ability to each
decision that needs to be made for the businesses, as is required by the Oral Agreements. If

Mr. Stowell or Gary Ostler's heirs are allowed to assume Gary Ostler's role under the Oral
Agreements, the fundamental nature and foundation of the agreements will have changed.
Under Mr. StowelPs interpretation, the obligations of the Oral Agreements survive
death and the retirement of the parties and survive the transfer of shares to third parties
(despite the contractual provision stating that shares would not be transferted to third
parties). According to Mr. Stowell, the Oral Agreements "run with the shares" in perpetuity,
forever binding current and future shareholders to manage the Ostler Corporations with the
unanimous mutual consent of all shareholders regardless of the identity, ability or number of
shareholders.
D.

Enforcement of the Oral Agreements Would Subject Dale Ostler to A
Lifetime of Involuntary Servitude

Finally, according to Mr. Stowell, Dale Ostler is obligated to manage the Ostler
Corporations for the rest of his life, cannot resign and cannot retire. Dale Ostler's personal
health, freedom, desires and dreams are of no consequence. It would impose an extreme
burden amounting to involuntary servitude. "But no man can have a vested interest in the
work or labor of another. He has no right in law to insist that another must work for him.
Such right would amount to involuntary servitude or slavery and be in violation of Section 21
of Article 1 of the State Constitution." McGreiv v. Industrial Comm% 85 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah
1938). See also U.S. Const, amend. XIII. That Dale Ostler and Gary Ostler could have
intended such a result defies belief, not to mention the terms of the Oral Agreements.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Ruling and Order should be affirmed on all points. The plain
language of Section 732, with its use of the mandatory word, "shall," makes this a simple

case: Section 732fs writing and signing requirements are mandatory. The analysis frankly
should end there.
All parties agree that the Oral Agreements are subject to Section 732 of the Revised
Act. The underlying premise as to whether Section 732 invalidates otherwise enforceable
contracts or validates otherwise void contracts is where the parties diverge.
Section 732 enables a safe harbor where shareholders may tailor to their specific
needs the scheme of corporate governance. Section 732 simply requires the shareholders
demonstrate by a to a written agreement their intent to vary statutorily-required governance
by a Board of Directors. Absent an agreement in writing to the contrary, however, even that
safe harbor is limited to a ten-year period. The Oral Agreements fail to comply with the safe
harbor provisions of Section 732 in two material respects: The Oral Agreements are not in
writing signed by all shareholders and, because they are not in writing, obviously do not
contain a written provision extending them for more than ten years.
To enforce these unwritten agreements would do violence to the statutory scheme. It
would add uncertainty to the corporate structure and would allow allegations of oral
agreements that would bind successor generations of shareholders in perpetuity. Accepting
this proposition would require the Ostler Corporations, 50 years from now, to be governed
by the unanimous agreement of dozens if not hundreds of potentially unqualified individual
shareholders (with the only qualification being that they are heirs of Dale Ostler or heirs of
Gary Ostler, or their heirs or the heirs of their heirs, etc).
Finally, the trial court correctly found that the Oral Agreements were personal to
Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler and expired upon Gary Ostler's death. The material terms of
the Oral Agreements mandated that the Ostler Corporations be managed only and solely

through the mutual agreement of Gary and Dale Osder, only for the mutual benefit of Gary
and Dale Osder, and that Gary and Dale Osder would not transfer their shares. None of
those terms can be met in the absence of Gary Osder. Because the participation of Gary
Osder is a material part of the Oral Agreements, they were personal contracts that expired
upon Gary Osder's death.
This Court should affirm the trial court's Ruling and Order that Mr. Stowell's
Complaint failed to state legally viable claims for relief because the Oral Agreements upon
which Mr. Stowell's claims are based fail to meet the requirements of Section 732 of the
Revised Act. The Court also should affirm the trial court's Ruling and Order that the Oral
Agreements cannot be enforced because they constitute personal services contracts that
expired upon the death of Gary Osder.
Dated: November 21, 2005.
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